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I. PROJECT OBJECTIVE:
This project represents one of several important components of 
the multi-state/provincial Gulf of Maine Program sponsored by the 
provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and the states of Maine, 
New Hampshire and Massachusetts. In short, the purpose was to 
examine options available to the Council on the Marine Environment 
for pursuing the establishment of more formal recognition of the 
Gulf of Maine Initiative.
To this end, the following report is organized into three 
major parts. The first consists of an analysis of the various 
structural/institutional options available to the Council; the 
second examines relevant United States and Canadian examples; and, 
the third offers recommendations based on the various report 
findings. Issues addressed include the following: What are the 
universe of structural and institutional options available to the 
Council? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach? What Canadian and U.S. examples can be drawn upon? How 
successful has each of the options been in stimulating regional 
cooperation? What, if any, role should the U.S. State Department 
and Canadian Foreign Ministry play in the process? Is an 
international treaty necessary? What would be the most appropriate 
regional compact for the Gulf of Maine region? What are the 
elements of the most appropriate regional compact?
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II. GULF OF MAINE COUNCIL ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES:
* To encourage generation of appropriate and timely monitoring 
information to environmental and resource managers and the 
general public in order to allow both efficient and effective 
management action, evaluation, and public awareness of such 
action.
* To assist in the reduction of impacts of point source 
pollution of the Gulf of Maine.
* To facilitate regional efforts to assure proper disposal of 
debris and vessel wastes within the marine environment of the 
Gulf.
* To evaluate existing laws and regulations relating to Gulf 
natural resources in order to reduce disparities and improve 
performance of those laws and regulations.
* To assist in the reduction of impacts of non-point source 
pollution on the Gulf of Maine.
* To promote the protection, restoration, and enhancement of 
fish and wildlife habitat within the Gulf of Maine region.
* To develop and implement a regional citizens7 education and 
participation program with the intent of involving citizens in 
local resource management issues.1
1 The Gulf of Maine Action Plan, July 1991. Prepared by the 
Gulf of Maine Working Group for the Council on the Marine 
Environment, p. 6.
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III. STRUCTURAL/INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL:
The options chosen for examination in the following section 
are the passing of common legislation, creation of a regional 
council or task force, interstate compact, federal interstate 
compact, regional compact (consisting of all five jurisdictions) 
and the passing of an international treaty. In illustrating 
these options, particular attention will be paid to their 
individual characteristics, history, usage, strengths and 
weaknesses.
a . common. Legislation
Although not of a "structural” or "institutional" form per se, 
this option is one that can be utilized regardless of which 
alternative the Council agrees to undertake. In short, this would 
involve comparing and contrasting the pertinent state, provincial 
and federal laws in order to pursue the passing of common 
legislation.2
The principal strength of this option is that it offers the 
opportunity to effectuate regional cooperation by adopting uniform 
state, provincial and federal laws, thereby mitigating the 
potential for conflict in achieving regulatory goals. In addition, 
it is something that can be achieved incrementally and continuously 
over the life-span of the organization. Moreover, working toward 
passing common legislation does not require any "formal" 
organizational structure other than perhaps a council or commission 
charged with collating the necessary legislative data, drafting 
proposed legislation, etc. Lastly, to do so conceivably may take 
a great deal less time to achieve than forming a regional 
interstate compact, for example.
The primary weakness of this effort lies in the potentially 
vast differences in Canadian and American environmental laws and 
the possible confusion and time loss that may result from 
subsequent legislative efforts. For this reason, such an endeavor 
should be combined with a more "structural" option in the 
furtherance of the Council's objectives.
2 Such a study is already underway pursuant to a contract 
between the Maine State Planning Office and the Marine Law 
Institute at the University of Maine School of Law in Portland, 
Maine. The study will compare and contrast existing coastal and 
marine related laws and regulations adopted by the concerned 
states, provinces and the two federal governments. The Marine law 
Institute will develop joint findings with the Oceans Institute of 
Canada on the major points of coordination, inconsistencies, and 
gaps between the statutory responses in the various jurisdictions.
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«B. Regional Council or Task Force
This is essentially what is already in place and known as The 
Council on the Marine Environment. Created via the Agreement on 
Conservation of the Marine Environment of the Gulf of Maine by the 
governors of Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, and the 
premiers of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the Council functions in 
many ways similar to the British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task 
Force and the St. Croix International Waterway Commission (examined 
in this report at pages 16 and 19, respectively). Broadly stated, 
the charge of all three groups is to protect, conserve and manage 
their respective area resources by conducting research, educating 
the community and coordinating regional efforts.
1. History and Usage:
There is a great deal that can be accomplished with a regional 
council or task force. The role of such an organization can be 
either advisory or planning/management or both. The institutional 
form has been used in a variety of settings ranging from an issue 
specific, advisory and recommendatory role to a permanent, multi­
state authority with extensive powers.
2. Characteristics:
There are four principal characteristics of the council form:
1. it is a formally articulated agreement between two or 
more states to address an issue of mutual concern,
2. it represents the creation of a management and 
implementation entity,
3. it provides procedures to facilitate the participation 
and cooperative decision making of its signatories, and
4. it has a level of authority which does not invoke the 
compact clause of the United States Constitution.3
Regarding the last characteristic, the inherent limit of the 
device is that it is vested with very little or most often no 
regulatory authority. For this reason, it has generally been used 
by states in those instances where a formal multi-state 
organization, short of a compact agency is sought.
3 This section on characteristics is adapted generally from
Michael Donahue, Institutional__Arramejnei&S__for Great Lakes
Management (MI: Michigan Sea Grant College Program, 1987), p. 136. 
[hereinafter DONAHUE].
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3(a). Strengths:
Because this option is not subject to Congressional 
involvement or approval, it is easily-formed and potentially very 
flexible. It can be created in a variety of ways, including 
federal legislation, common state legislation, or an agreement 
between governors (and premiers, as in the case at hand). In 
addition, because the federal level is generally uninvolved, the 
agency has the freedom to serve a variety of management needs. In 
the past, similar groups have proven to be particularly strong when 
placed in an advisory and coordinating role.
3(b). Weaknesses:
Because the arrangement is not "federally-sanctioned," as is 
a compact, it is almost always limited to "soft-management" 
functions - those that do not interfere with established state or 
federal functions. In addition, it is not as legally binding upon 
its signatories as a compact and its funding is difficult to 
guarantee. Lastly, without a legally, not just "politically" 
binding agreement, the commitment levels of the jurisdictions are 
questionable over the life-span of the agency. For example, the 
St. Croix International Waterway Commission's funding problems, 
brought on by Maine's rapidly decreasing budget commitment, 
threatens the long-term survival of the Commission.4 For this 
reason and others, some groups like the British Columbia/States Oil 
Spill Task Force have recommended that an interstate (and possibly 
international) compact be created in order to ensure the succession 
of its objectives.
C. Interstate Compact
1. History and Usage:
"The most binding legal instrument to establish formal 
cooperation among states is known as the interstate compact or 
agreement."5 An interstate compact is essentially a contract or 
treaty between states which is sanctioned by the United States 
Congress. The constitutional support for the device is found in 
Article I, Section 10, clause 3, which reads that, "No state shall, 
without the Consent of Congress...enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State or with a foreign Power."6 Though the 
language seems relatively clear, it is so brief as to leave 
important questions unanswered, namely those regarding why and how
4 This is discussed in greater detail at p. 21.
5 Interstate Compacts 1783-1977__LA Be.vised Compilation.)
(Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1977), p. vii.
6 U.S. Constit., Art. I, sec. 10, Cl. 3.
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compacts are created.7 As a result, the rise of the interstate 
compact has largely been a process of trial and error for the 
states.
In the early history of the United States, the compact device 
was most often used by neighboring states to settle boundary 
disputes. By 1930, however, compacts were being advanced for 
different purposes. For example, of the approximately eighteen 
compacts formed during the 1920's and 1930's, one was directed at 
the control and reduction of pollution in New York Harbor (the Tri- 
State Pollution Compact, ratified by the states of Connecticut, New 
Jersey and New York), and another was created for the purpose of 
establishing park and recreational systems in New York and New 
Jersey (the Palisades Interstate Park Agreement).*  From 1940 to 
the mid 1970's, well over 100 compacts were created, thereby 
utilizing the device with more frequency and variety than ever 
before. During this time period, compacts were enacted in such 
areas as fisheries conservation, land and water resources, forest 
fire protection, mining practices, corrections, taxation, nuclear 
energy, educational facilities, civil defense, mass transit, health 
services and facilities, economic growth research, waste disposal, 
and flood control.9
2. Characteristics:
As characterized by Zimmermann and Wendell, the interstate 
compact has the following six distinguishing characteristics:
1. It is formal and contractual.
2. It is an agreement between the states themselves, 
similar in content, form, and wording to an international 
treaty, and usually embodied in state law in an identifiable 
and separate document called the "compact."
3. It is enacted in substantially identical words by the 
legislature of each compacting state.
4. At least in certain cases, consent of Congress must be 
obtained; in all cases, Congress may forbid the compact by
Frederick L. Zimmermann and M. Wendell, The Interstate 
Compact Since 1925 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 
1951), p. 30. [hereinafter ZIMMERMANN].
* Kevin J. Heron, "The Interstate Compact in Transition: 
From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced 
Agreements," St. John's Law Review. Volume 60, Fall 1985, Number 1, 
pp. 7-8.
9 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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specific enactment.
5. It can be enforced by suit in the Supreme Court of the 
United States if necessary.
6. It takes precedence over an ordinary state statute.10 
3(a). Strengths:
As a fully accepted and effective instrument of interstate 
cooperation, the compact device offers the following strengths:
1. It is a tried, proven, legally binding and enforceable 
device which supercedes state law for the collective good 
of the compacting states. As such, it provides a degree of 
stability and continuity which is often lacking in other 
forms of agreement.
2. The interstate compact language generally provides for a 
Commission consisting of representatives from each of the 
signatory parties, which will be charged with the 
coordination and implementation of the compact's goals.
3. Use of the compact is extremely flexible and can be 
quite powerful; its development is limited only by the 
ability of its signatory parties to secure Congressional 
ratification. In theory, it has the capability to vest an 
interstate compact commission with broad management 
authority and regulatory power.
4. The device generally treats all of the signatories as 
equals, thereby encouraging the continued goodwill among the 
jurisdictions.
5. Altering or amending the compact generally requires the 
unanimous consent of its parties, again serving to 
facilitate an ongoing cooperative relationship between 
them.11 It should be noted, however, that the amendment 
process can be a long and unpredictable exercise that 
requires a minimum of 2 to 5 years to complete. For this 
reason, many would consider it a compact weakness.
3(b). Weaknesses:
Weaknesses of the device generally stem not from its 
characteristics, but from the political environment surrounding its 
proposed use and operation. Perhaps the most daunting of obstacles
10 ZIMMERMANN, p. 42.
11 DONAHUE, p. 128.
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is the length of time it can take to ratify a compact. For 
example, the second Hoover Commission determined that an average of 
eight years and nine months was required to complete the compacting 
process for those proposals which were able to survive all other 
necessary steps. "The attendant investment of time and political 
energy is substantial, and in some instances, might be better 
expended on alternate institutional arrangements."12
Because the success of the compact is so related to the 
political environment at the state, federal and Congressional 
levels, the often necessary compromises may leave the device 
considerably weaker than originally intended. If the concessions 
are not made, ratification of the compact may be interminably 
delayed.
Other criticisms of the compact include instances where the 
autonomous commissions formed by compact language have become 
politically unresponsive to their respective state constituencies 
and where some compacts/commissions have become ineffective, 
thereby resulting in another unnecessary layer of government.13
D. Federal Interstate Compact
Such a compact, in this instance, would consist of Maine, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts and a federal representative. In every 
way, except the federal participation, this type of compact is 
identical to the interstate compact in terms of characteristics, 
creation, operation and potential powers. The role of the federal 
member can vary from non-voting, observatory status to full-member 
voting privileges.
In this case scenario, potential federal members might include 
representative(s) from the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Department of the Interior and the United States 
Coast Guard, to name a few.
The obvious strength of such an arrangement is that, by 
allowing for federal participation, the potential for conflict is 
mitigated, thereby accelerating the ratifying process. What 
essentially happens in such a case is that federal and state laws 
pertinent to the compact merge to further the compact's objectives. 
Although still experimental, one example of where this device has 
been used successfully can be seen with the Delaware River Basin
12 Ibid., p. 128.
13 James P. Hill, "The Great Lakes Quasi Compact: An Emerging 
Paradigm For Regional Governance of U.S. Water Resources?" Detroit 
College of Law Review. Volume 1989, Spring, Issue 1, p. 9. 
[hereinafter HILL].
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Compact.
In addition to those weaknesses listed for the interstate 
compact, the principal weakness relevant to this option is that 
while the federal level is included, the international one (the two 
Canadian provinces) is not. Thus, some variation of this device 
would be required to yield the "ideal" institutional form for the 
Council on the Marine Environment. Again, it is important to note 
that the inclusion of a federal member is not a tried and true 
form, but rather still very experimental. The fact that the 
federal government acquiesced to membership in the Delaware River 
Basin Compact does not guarantee that it will sanction this role in 
other situations.
E. Regional Compact (states and provinces)
This type of compact would consist of all five member 
jurisdictions of the Council on the Marine Environment. Largely 
due to the ambiguity of the compact clause and the seeming 
reluctance of Congress to endorse such an arrangement, there are 
very few binational compacts in existence. Nevertheless, it has 
precedence and is viewed as a legitimate institutional option for 
consideration. Like the federal interstate compact, this variation 
has the same basic strengths and weaknesses of the interstate 
compact. The point of departure from both the federal and the 
interstate compacts comes with the binational nature of this third 
type.
Strengths associated with this option include the following:
1. The device succeeds in addressing a region-specific 
concern which has perhaps been ineffectively addressed at 
the federal level.
2. The full, voting membership status of the two Canadian 
provinces secures a stronger commitment to the agency's 
goals than would another institutional form.
3. Binational funding of the compact-created management 
entity would be available in the compacting language.
Although admittedly a very attractive option for the Council, 
it is important to realize that the international compact is even 
more replete with legal and political obstacles than the previous 
two compact types. The limited history of the device suggests 
heavy opposition from both federal levels and a general reluctance 
of states to enter into such "contracts" with foreign entities.
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact (discussed in 
detail at pp. 24-26), created in 1949 and joined by Quebec and New 
Brunswick in 1970, is recognized as the first binational compact. 
Although there are now a few more of these compacts in existence,
9
they address such uncontroversial issues as the building of a 
bridge (the Buffalo-Port Erie Public Bridge Authority) and 
construction of an international access highway (Minnesota-Manitoba 
Highway Agreement). To date, the Northeastern Forest Fire 
Protection Compact is the only one which concerns a natural 
resource of broad significance.14 * Given this background, Marian 
Ridgeway asserts that,
It is therefore clear that under rather limited 
circumstances an international agreement of the 
interstate compact type can be enacted and can function 
successfully. It is also probable that compacts on 
broader economic and social substantive matters 
involving international relations will not obtain 
support from the United States Department of State, 
unless (and this can by no means as yet be construed as 
applying to all cases) the international matters and 
actions which result shall be required to clear through 
the Department of State, which reserves the right to 
reject them.16
F. International Treaty
1. History and Usage:
The international treaty is a formal binational agreement 
which compares favorably with other types of institutional forms 
due to its binational nature, degree of formality and demonstrated 
success.16 The most potent international legal device available 
to two nations wishing to address a common concern, the treaty has 
long been used by countries in their common dealings.
The power to make a treaty is given expressly to the 
President, but ratification is made contingent upon the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Similarly, the ratification process in 
Canada requires approval of the Prime Minister with the advice and 
consent of the Parliament.17 An often cited example of the treaty
14 This section on the history of the binational compact 
device is derived from Marian C. Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts - A 
Question of Federalism (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 155-156. [hereinafter 
RIDGEWAY].
16 Ibid., p. 156. Reference is made to the ratification 
problems encountered by the Great Lakes Basin Compact. For more 
detailed analysis, see pp. 11-15.
17
DONAHUE, p. 143. 
Ibid., p. 143.
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device is the "Treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions between the United States 
and Canada” (commonly known as the Boundary Waters Treaty). Signed 
in 1909, this treaty created the International Joint Commission 
(IJC) and accorded it a variety of "quasi-judicial, investigative 
and surveillance/coordination functions.1,18
2(a). Strengths:
As a binational agreement negotiated and signed by the two 
executive branches, the treaty has a distinct legal stature in the 
international community. Although, unlike a compact, the treaty 
affords very little enforcement power, it creates the incentive for 
continued cooperation by virtue of its binational roots. Not 
surprisingly, treaties tend to be stable and enduring arrangements. 
Similar to the compact, the treaty is capable of creating an 
implementation or management body charged with overseeing the 
objectives of the treaty.
2(b). Weaknesses:
Because they involve the federal level, treaties are subject 
to many of the same problems encountered by the binational compact. 
Namely, treaties are established rarely and typically after 
laborious effort and lengthy negotiations. In addition, the 
likelihood of ratification of a treaty depends not only upon the 
political climate surrounding the issues at stake and the relations 
between the two countries, but the climate in Washington as well.
Most notably, treaty relations between the U.S. and Canada 
suffered a setback, when in 1980, the Senate failed to ratify a 
treaty for joint management of East Coast fisheries. Although the 
treaty had been signed by the two governments 18 months before, it 
became stuck in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee due to the 
opposition of some New England senators. As Michael Glennon notes, 
"the hand that signs is not the hand that delivers; what looks like 
a good bargain to diplomats at the negotiating table may look 
altogether different to legislators in the cold light of 
constituents' mail.,,x* In order to avoid this situation, the 
Council would have to secure commitment to its objectives from all 
relevant governmental levels.
18 Ibid., p. 144. The IJC has played a very important role 
in the Great Lakes region, and although a valuable example for 
further research, its jurisdiction does not extend to include ocean 
waters.
19 Michael Glennon, "The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification," 
American Journal of International Law. April, 1983, pp. 257-258.
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«IV. CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES EXAMPLES TO DRAW UPON
The purpose of the following section is to analyze several 
existing institutional organizations with the thought that one may 
serve as a potential role model for the Council. To that end, the 
Great Lakes Commission, British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task 
Force, St. Croix International Waterway Commission, Northwest Power 
Planning Council and Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Council 
have been chosen as examples based on their particular relevance to 
the objectives of the Gulf Council.
A. The Great Lakes
1. Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:
There are several groups at work in this region. Some of the 
larger and more well-known ones are as follows:
The International Joint Commission
Although not strictly a Great Lakes organization, the IJC does 
a great deal of its work in this region. Established by 
Canada and the United States under the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909, it has jurisdiction over all water which flows 
between the U.S. and Canada.
The Great Lakes Commission
Created by interstate compact in 1955, the Commission is made 
up of representatives from the eight Great Lakes States 
(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). Its purpose is to guide, protect 
and advance the common interests of the eight member states.
The Center for the Great Lakes
Founded in 1983, the Center is a private, nonprofit 
organization committed to serving the needs of the Great Lakes 
decision makers. The Center played a key role in laying the 
groundwork for the Great Lakes Protection Fund.
The Council of Great Lakes Governors
Established in 1983, this group of the eight state governors 
has recorded such achievements as the Great Lakes Charter, the 
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement and the Great 
Lakes Protection Fund.
The Great Lakes Protection Fund
Created in 1989, the Fund consists of a $100 million 
endowment, initially realized by contributions from the eight 
Great Lakes states. The purpose of the Fund is to support 
those state and regional projects dedicated to controlling
12
toxics in the region.20 *
Because it represents the most "formalized" group in the Great 
Lakes region, the Great Lakes Commission will generally be the 
basis for the following discussion.
As referenced above, the Commission was created by interstate 
compact in 1955. It was ratified by Congress in 1968 under the 
name of the Great Lakes Basin Compact. Currently, the Commission 
consists of 35 Commissioners - state officials, legislators and 
appointees from all eight of the states' governors. Article I of 
the compact identified its mandate as:
1. To promote the orderly, integrated, and comprehensive 
development, use, and conservation of the water resources 
of the Great Lakes Basin (hereinafter called the Basin).
2. To plan for the welfare and development of the water 
resources of the Basin as a whole as well as for those 
portions of the Basin which may have problems of special 
concern.
3. To make it possible for the states of the Basin and their 
people to derive the maximum benefit from utilization of 
public works, in the form of navigational aids or otherwise, 
which may exist or which may be constructed from time to 
time.
4. To advise in securing and maintaining a proper balance among 
industrial, commercial, agricultural, water supply, 
residential, recreational, and other legitimate uses of the 
water resources of the Basin.
5. To establish and maintain an intergovernmental agency to the 
end that the purposes of this compact may be accomplished 
more effectively.
2(a). Strengths:
In his lengthy study of the various existing institutions for 
Great Lakes management, Michael Donahue lists two of the 
Commission's primary strengths as having legal authority under the 
Great Lakes Basin Compact and the ability to address a broad range
20 This section is derived from information found in Craig
Freshley's report entitled, "Funding the Gulf of Maine Program,"
prepared for the Finance Network of the Gulf of Maine Council on 
the Marine Environment, January 1991, p. 73. For a more detailed
study of the various Great Lakes organizations, see pp. 67-94 of
that report, [hereinafter FRESHLEY].
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nof economic development and environmental issues.21 However, as 
James Hill notes, and Donahue agrees, "most studies, including a 
major survey of the attitudes of key Great Lakes decision makers, 
conclude that the existing Great Lakes compact is inadequate both 
as a regional management body and as an effective device for 
deterring federal intervention in the region's water control 
decisions."22 For this reason, a closer look at the inherent 
weaknesses of the compact/commission is warranted.
2(b). Weaknesses:
Based on extensive interviews and in-depth study, Donahue's 
laundry list of Commission weaknesses include the following:
limited mandate and absence of implementation authority? 
inadequate Canadian representation; limited state interest 
and support? inconsistent/inadequate state involvement and 
leadership? unclear direction at state and staff levels? 
lack of follow-through and impact? inability to achieve 
consensus; low public profile and level of support? singular 
focus on issues? poor caliber or inappropriate selection of 
Commissioners? and staffing/funding inadequacies.23
Similarly, Hill sums up the Commission's primary deficiency as 
"the lack of political will on the part of the Great Lakes states 
to invest the necessary economic and political resources in these 
institutions necessary for resolving regional problems removed from 
their borders."24 Moreover, because of its "soft" management 
authority to conduct only research, coordinate activities, advise 
on and advocate issues, no singular authority is left in charge of 
the region as a whole.25 26
3. Funding:
Article VII of the Commission's bylaws provide that "all 
component states shall share equally in the expenses of the 
Commission.1,26 According to Donahue, contributions by the states 
amount to approximately two-thirds of the Commission's total 
budget, with the remaining two-thirds coming from various grants,
2 1
22
2 3
2 4
DONAHUE, 
HILL, p. 
DONAHUE, 
HILL, p.
pp. 230-231.
11.
p. 231.
12.
25 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
26 Great Lakes Commission Bylaws, Article VII.
*
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4. Role of State Dept./External Affairs:
This heading would more appropriately be titled, "role of 
Congress," as the courts and Congress have consistently limited the 
power of the Commission to those "soft" management functions 
referenced above. What is most interesting to note is that
ratification of the compact, weakened as it was, still took 
Congress 13 years, and that was only after the role of the 
provinces was virtually extinguished. According to Marian 
Ridgeway, the entire consent question was inextricably entangled 
with the international question raised by the compact.29
In drafting the compact so as to include the Canadian 
provinces, the language of Article II, Paragraph B read:
The Province of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or 
either of them, may become states party to this compact 
by taking such action as their laws and the laws of the 
Government of Canada may prescribe for adherence 
thereto.
As Donahue notes, this language was the "focal point of contention 
by the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, both of whom were 
wary of usurpation of their authority in relations with a foreign 
power."29 When Congress finally approved the compact in 1968, it 
included in Article IX an additional section which excluded the 
language of Article II, Paragraph B from consent because it 
".. .purport[s] to authorize recommendations to, or cooperation with 
any foreign or international governments, political subdivisions, 
agencies or bodies."
Nevertheless, as detailed in the next section, some 
interesting developments may be on the horizon regarding the 
relationship of the Great Lakes efforts vis-a-vis the federal 
government.
5. The Evolving Quasi-Compact:
Because the region is the largest source of fresh water in 
North America and consequently affects at least eight states and 
two provinces, it provides an excellent example for the purposes of 
this study. Efforts in the region have been marked by a flurry of 
different players and by consistent court decisions asserting the
contracts and interest on investments.27
39
FRESHLEY, p. 83. 
RIDGEWAY, p. 157. 
DONAHUE, p. 134.
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primacy of Congress in regulating the area's resources.30
Having examined the problems associated with the Great Lakes 
Basin Compact, the increasing need to find creative ways of making 
the compact device more effective is apparent.31 According to 
James Hill, the Council of Great Lakes Governors (COGS) has emerged 
as a "quasi compact," and a potentially very powerful actor in the 
region.
As stated previously, this group of the eight state governors 
was established in 1983. Briefly, its purpose was to "foster 
cooperation on environmental and economic policy issues common to 
its eight member states."32 The articles of incorporation detail 
a much more broad and ambitious charge, yet one that is still 
lacking in any regulatory power or authority. "Yet its high 
profile, political membership and organizational structure had 
unique characteristics that made it an ideal choice for 
spearheading efforts to improve regional governance in the Great 
Lakes basin."33
Hill asserts that COGS went through a series of steps taken in 
a "compact-like process" that have established it as a quasi 
compact. First, it negotiated an agreement on common issues to be 
resolved on a joint basis (the Great Lakes Charter, signed in 1985 
by COGS members, as well as the governors of New York and 
Pennsylvania and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec). COGS then 
pledged to initiate state enabling legislation in implementing the 
Charter. The final step involved obtaining the "consent" of 
Congress which came with an amendment to a general water resources 
authorization bill enacted by Congress - a very unorthodox way, to 
be sure. In short, the amendment transferred the Congressional 
power to prevent the diversion of Great Lakes water to the 
governors of the Great Lakes states.34 The passing of this federal 
authority to COGS, though not creating a formal, traditional 
compact, gave it a new, previously undefined status. Hill 
concludes that this new role may have profound implications for the 
future of the region. If it is possible, an institutional fusing 
of COGS and the Great Lakes Commission may be the short-term answer 
to a long-term problem.
30 HILL, p. 1.
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 From a brochure published by the Council entitled, "Council 
of Great Lakes Governors - Great Lakes - Great Future."
33 HILL, p. 15.
34 For a more detailed discussion of how this occurred, see 
HILL, pp. 14-21.
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B. British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task Force
1. Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:
The British Columbia/States Oil Spill Task Force was formed in 
1989 by Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California and British 
Columbia. The original objectives of the Force - to jointly study, 
share information and develop recommendations on reducing the 
threat of oil spills on the West coast - were organized in response 
to the devastating Nestucca and Exxon Valdez oil spills.
Operation of the Task Force was initiated by an "Oil Spill 
Memorandum of Co-operation" initially signed on June 16, 1989 by 
Washington and British Columbia. Shortly thereafter, the remaining 
U.S. states signed on. The Memorandum dealt with future 
transboundary environment and wildlife issues and stressed the 
following:
* enhancing the environment and protecting it from oil 
spills;
* protecting transboundary fish and wildlife from damage 
caused by spills and other discharges of oil?
* maintaining and improving a coordinated response to oil 
spills; and
* pursuing the above in cooperation with the federal 
governments of Canada and the United States.
Under the memorandum, each jurisdiction agreed to appoint a 
representative to the task force, which would ultimately be 
charged with the following tasks:
* creation of a joint emergency response plan?
* evaluation of capabilities and technologies for spill 
prevention, response and containment;
* review of tanker safety, routing and operating 
requirements ? *
* inventory of equipment, material, personnel and other 
resources available to either the province or the states for 
use in oil spill control and clean-up operations? and
* joint spill response drills and training.
Four subcommittees - Prevention Alternatives, Emergency Response, 
Financial Recovery and Technology Sharing - were established in 
pursuit of these goals.
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mThe memorandum states that its duration is "intended to be 
perpetual," but that each party may terminate upon written notice 
to the others.35
2(a). Strengths:
Many of the Task Force's recommendations have already been 
carried out. The five jurisdictions have conducted joint drills, 
shared information, coordinated their response efforts and prepared 
similar oil spill prevention legislation.36 In addition, all 
members of the Task Force now have citizens' advisory groups 
charged with monitoring oil spill contingency planning in those 
states.37
In view of these accomplishments, the primary strength of the 
Task Force appears to be the continuing high level of commitment 
among its signatories.
2(b). Weaknesses:
Some critics have complained that the oil spill prevention 
legislation prompted by the report of the States/British Columbia 
Task Force has a big bark and no bite. Referring to Washington 
House Bill 1027, one critic "warned that provisions of the bill 
'are so weak that we will get all the rhetoric but no action.'"38
The complaint is perhaps symptomatic of a larger problem 
befalling the efforts of the Task Force. As with many similar 
entities, this one has no regulatory authority. In response, the 
Task Force, along with two other bodies, has endorsed the creation 
of an interstate and possibly international compact (one which 
would include British Columbia) charged with having the regulatory 
power necessary to prevent oil spills.
3. Funding:
No formal budget was allocated to the Task Force. Under the 
Memorandum, members were directed to share costs associated with
35 Final Report of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task 
Force, October 1990, pp. 15-17. [hereinafter REPORT].
36 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
37 "B.C. Forms Citizens' Spill Panel," Platt's Oilqram News. 
3 May 1991, vol. 69, No. 86, p. 4.
38 Jon Savelle, "Oil-Spill Prevention Proposed —  Critics 
Complain Drafts Are All Rhetoric But No Action," The Seattle Times. 
24 February 1991, p. B2.
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4- Role of State Dept./External Affairs:
The Task Force, not being a legal or administrative entity, 
functions according to existing state, provincial and federal laws 
and therefore has not been of concern to the federal level. With 
regard to the compact effort, no clear role has yet emerged.
5. An Emerging Pacific Ocean Resources Compact:
The Memorandum creating the Task Force is clear to state that 
the "parties do not intend by this Memorandum to create any 
separate legal or administrative entity."39 40 This notwithstanding, 
in consultation with two interstate bodies, the Pacific Fisheries 
Task Force and the Ocean Resources Committee of the Council of 
State Government's Western Conference, the Task Force has endorsed 
the creation of an interstate compact which would also include 
Hawaii with Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California. In 
addition, the province of British Columbia could join the group, 
either as a non-voting member, or, if Congress and the Canadian 
federal government approved, as a full member.41
Legislation for the compact has now been introduced in all of 
the states (see Appendix A for a copy of the pertinent California 
bill). In essence, the compact would "have the authority to 
establish uniform safety standards for routes, crews and equipment 
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances up and down 
the west coast."42 Because the compact would provide uniform 
standards in the region rather than five different sets of state 
laws, the oil and shipping companies have responded favorably. 
Nonetheless, even if all five states adopt the legislation, 
congressional approval of the compact remains uncertain. "The 
compact's area includes portions of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans
meetings and reports.39
39 REPORT, p. 17.
40 Oil Spill Memorandum of Co-operation Between the Province 
of British Columbia, the State of Washington, the State of Oregon, 
the State of Alaska and the State of California, June 1989.
41 Don Byron, "Pacific Ocean Compact: Bill Aims at Increasing 
State Influence," Alaska Journal of Commerce. 18 February 1991, 
vol. 13, No. 7, sec. 1, p. 1.
42 Ethan Rarick, "Western States to Consider Uniform Oil 
Shipping Rules," Proprietary to the United Press International, 31 
January 1991, BC cycle.
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bordering the states within the 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone."43 State Senator Bill Bradbury, sponsor of the Oregon 
compact bill, has said that congressional approval depends on 
keeping the support of the oil and shipping industries.44 45
C. St. Croix International Water^ Y  rnimnission
1. Structure/Participants/Objectives:
"Though this water body is minute compared to the Gulf of 
Maine, the Commission serves as an excellent example of 
international cooperation for the purposes of protecting the 
vitality of a water body, in the interests of both Americans and 
Canadians. Furthermore, it is an agreement between a U.S. state 
and a Canadian province; the federal governments are not directly 
involved.1,45
The impetus for the St. Croix International Waterway 
Commission was created by a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
1986 by New Brunswick and Maine. Enabling legislation for the 
Commission was passed in both jurisdictions in 1987. There are 
eight members of the Commission who are appointed equally by New 
Brunswick and Maine and serve on a voluntary basis for two years. 
The objectives of the Commission, as stated in the 1986 Memorandum 
are as follows:
a) protect and manage an increasingly valuable natural and 
recreational resource for current and future usage;
b) encourage and maintain a high quality back country 
recreational and educational experience for users of the 
resource;
c) encourage tourism, based on identified themes, with 
resultant economic benefits to the region;
d) protect and promote awareness of human heritage 
resources including both Indian and early European;
e) ensure coordination in the planning and management of a 
shared resource;
43 "Five Pacific Ocean States Working Toward Offshore Oil 
Transportation Plan," The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Daily 
Report for Executives. 27 February 1991, p. A-3.
44 Ibid.
45 FRESHLEY, p. 115.
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f) establish the mechanisms and processes to be used to 
ensure fair representation of all user groups thereby 
minimizing conflicts? and
g) obtain optimal benefits from recreational and 
educational use of the resource while recognizing the 
historic and current economic importance of the forest 
resource including its management and commercial 
utilization.4 *6
The Commission's 1988-1989 Annual Report identifies its mission as:
”To ensure cooperative, comprehensive management of the 
St. Croix International Waterway's natural, historical 
and recreational resources to provide maximum long term 
benefits - in environmental, cultural and economic 
terms - to the people who live in or visit the St.
Croix region.”47 *
2(a). Strengths:
Since the Commission began full operation in January of 
1989, it has seen several accomplishments. Within a year, the 
Commission was able to obtain and integrate Canadian and American 
information on the river into a database for use as a management 
tool. The Commission has also created a common map of the region 
and a shared library consisting of over 500 volumes. Most 
notable is an action or management plan drafted by the 
commission, which names long-term legislative and environmental 
goals for the region and is anticipated to succeed in both 
legislatures in late fall of 1991.
Lee Sochasky, Executive Director of the Commission, 
identifies the fact that the Commission is viewed as the "river's 
advocate,” and not as belonging to any one interest as its 
greatest strength.44 As a result, Sochasky stated that the 
Commission has been able to work successfully with corporations 
and other sometimes hard-to-reach groups.
44 Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Maine of
the United States and the Province of New Brunswick of Canada 
Regarding the St. Croix International Waterway, 17 November 1986.
[hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
47 St. Croix International Waterway Commission, Annual Report 
1988-1989, p. 5.
44 Telephone interview with Lee Sochasky, Executive Director, 
St. Croix International Waterway Commission, 16 July 1991.
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2(b). Weaknesses:
The two primary weaknesses of the Commission are that it has 
no regulatory power and that its funding is unstable. The first 
weakness has not presented a major problem thus far, probably due 
to the success that the Commission has had in dealing with the 
various groups (landowners, government agencies, industry, etc.). 
The second weakness, however, does place the Commission in 
jeopardy. As Lee Sochasky put it, because the Commission was 
created via a memorandum of understanding and not something more 
permanent, it "could be eliminated tomorrow." As things stand 
now, due to the well-known budget problems in Maine, the Maine 
state government cut the Commission's budget from $50,000 in 1990 
to $10,000 in 1991. Although New Brunswick has still committed 
to giving $50,000, the Commission funds will only carry it 
through October, 1991.
3. Funding:
The Commission is funded primarily by the governments of 
Maine and New Brunswick. The 1986 Memorandum of Understanding 
provides that, "the State of Maine and the Province of New 
Brunswick shall share the costs of developing and managing the 
St. Croix International Waterway.”4* The Commission is also 
able to accept funds from other sources including federal 
agencies, private corporations and individuals. To this end, the 
Commission has charitable status in both Canada and the United 
States. Given the recent developments with the decrease in 
Maine's financial commitment, this status may prove to be crucial 
to the long-term survival of the Commission.
4. Role of State Dept./External Affairs:
Since the Commission has not challenged or dealt directly 
with any federal jurisdiction matters, it has not had any contact 
with the State Department. However, regarding both federal 
levels of government, it is provided in the Memorandum that, 
"representatives of the Governments of the United States and 
Canada will be invited as observers by the Governor of Maine and 
the Premier of New Brunswick,” but that those representatives 
"shall not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum.”49 50
49 MEMORANDUM.
50 Ibid.
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D. Northwest Power Planning Council
1. Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:
Currently, there are only two interstate compacts which are 
able to exert authority over federal agencies. The power to do 
so must first be explicitly assented to by Congress.51 * One is 
the Northwest Power Planning Council and the other is the 
Columbia River Gorge Commission. Of the two, the Northwest Power 
Council is considered to the "the more powerful multi-state 
compact. 1,52
Through the Northwest Power Act of 1980 (PL 96-501), the 
United States Congress authorized the states of Idaho, Montana, 
Washington and Oregon to enter into an interstate compact, 
thereby creating the Northwest Power Planning Council. The 
Council consists of eight members - two appointed by each of the 
four state governors. Under the Act, Congress assigned the 
Council the following three duties:
1. Develop a 20-year electrical power plan that will 
guarantee adequate and reliable energy at the lowest cost to 
the Northwest.
2. Develop a program to protect and rebuild the fish and 
wildlife populations in the Columbia River Basin that have 
been affected by hydroelectric development.
3. Conduct an extensive program to involve the public in 
the Council's decision-making processes.
As such, the Council is a "policy-making" entity. The primary 
agencies that work under the Council to implement its power plan 
and fish and wildlife programs are the Bonneville Power 
Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The 
Council also works with various utilities, environmental groups, 
state and local governments, fish and wildlife agencies, Indian 
tribes and others who are involved in energy, fish and wildlife
51 This authority was challenged and upheld in Seattle Master 
Builders v. Pacific Northwest Power.and Conservation Council. 786
F.2d. 1359, 1364 (1986).
82 Harry Bader, "Potential Utility of an Interstate Compact 
as a Vehicle for Oil Spill Prevention and Response," SPILL - The 
Wreck of the Exxon Valdez. Appendix M, University of Alaska Sea 
Grant Legal Research Team, 1989, p. 5.
23
issues.53
2(a). Strengths:
The primary strength of the Council is, without a doubt, its 
policy-making and influencing capacity. The most specific 
acknowledgment of the Council's strength is Section 6(c) of the 
Northwest Power Act which requires Bonneville to submit any major 
acquisition (anything over 500 megawatts and of five-years' 
duration) to the Council for review. If the Council does not find 
the acquisition consistent with its power plan or fish and wildlife 
programs, it may refuse the acquisition. Bonneville's only remedy 
then is to go to the U.S. Congress.54 5 In short, this is a case in 
which the federal government has allowed its' agencies to be bound 
by a non-federal agency.
Fortunately for the Council, another strength has been the 
generally favorable relationship it has shared with Bonneville. 
"By the time [James] Jura took office as Bonneville Administrator, 
both agencies had begun to pay less attention to defining their 
turfs, and began working together toward shared objectives.... 
Today, I would characterize the relationship between the Council 
and Bonneville as a very strong, cooperative and productive working 
relationship.,,ss
2(b). Weaknesses:
Despite the authority of the Council vis-a-vis the various 
federal agencies, it is often still forced to go to Congress to 
achieve its objectives. For example, one of the biggest problems 
addressed in the Council's fish and wildlife program has been high 
fish mortality caused by the turbines of the dams and altered 
river flows. To mitigate this, the Council has sought to put in 
place permanent bypass systems at each dam. To do so, however, it 
must work with the Army Corps of Engineers. In 1987, 1988 and 
again in 1989, the Council had to go to Congress to get the Corps 
to fund the much-needed installation of bypass systems. As Tom 
Trulove, Chairman of the Council, noted, "so far, Congress has 
responded, but it has taken a lot of regional resources, and,
53 This information on the structure and objectives of the 
Council has been derived from a pamphlet entitled, "Northwest Power 
Planning Council."
54 Remarks Before the Oregon Chapter Federal Bar Association 
by Tom Trulove, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning Council, 21 
December 1989, p. 4.
55 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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frankly, the Corps' foot-dragging on this issue has set back the 
schedule for installing screens.”56
3. Funding:
The Council is funded by Bonneville Power Administration rate 
revenues, but in no way is part of Bonneville.57 The Council's 
budget for Fiscal Year 1991 was $7,616,000.58
4. Role of State Dept./External Affairs:
Not applicable as there is no foreign contingent to the 
Council.
E. Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission
1. Structure/Participants/Ob jectives:
The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission was created 
in 1949 by interstate compact. Besides being the first forest fire 
protection compact, it was the first to authorize participation 
outside the United States, by adjacent Provinces in Canada.5* Its 
original members were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island (in 1950), and Vermont. The 
Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec became full members 
in 1970. Article I of the compact asserts its purpose as, ”To 
promote effective prevention and control of forest fires in the 
northeastern region of the United States and adjacent areas in 
Canada.”60 Article IV lists its duties as the following:
(1) (a) To study method and practice, etc., for bringing about
prevention and control of forest fires.
(b) To coordinate the forest fire plans and work of the
56 Ibid., p. 15.
57 Ibid., p. 1.
58 Northwest Power Planning Council, 1990 Annual Report, 
p. 38.
3* w<phe Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission - What 
it is and how it operates," p. B-l.
60 Ibid., p. B-2.
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mseveral states.
(c) to facilitate the sending of aid.
(2) Formulate and revise a regional forest 
as a common fire plan for the region.
fire plan to serve
(3) Recommend to the several Governors and 
measures to promote the purpose of the
State Legislatures 
compact.
(4) Consult and advise with administrative 
states regarding fire control problems 
adoption of appropriate regulations.
agencies of the 
and recommend the
w
(5) Recommend to the states any and all measures which will 
effectuate the prevention and control of forest fires.61 62
The Commission consists of 27 Commissioners - three from each
of the states and provinces. The appointed Commissioners and 
various forest fire personnel meet periodically for mutual 
direction, training, experience, and information exchange.62
2(a). Strengths:
The greatest strength of the Commission according to its 
Executive Director, Richard Mullavey, is that it is 
"institutionalized." In other words, because it was created by 
interstate compact, it has avoided the financial and other pitfalls 
common to groups like the St. Croix International Waterway 
Commission.63 In addition, its longevity (since 1949) establishes 
it as one of the oldest, still-active compacts.
2(b). Weaknesses:
With regard to its unambiguous and narrow objective, the 
Commission has genuinely succeeded and is indeed a very good 
example of an effective compact/commission. Mullavey's only 
complaint (if it can be referred to as such) is that there are not
61 Ibid., p. B-3.
62 Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission, 1990 Annual 
Report.
63 Telephone interview with Richard Mullavey, Executive 
Director, Northeastern Forest Fire Commission, 23 July 1991. The 
address for the Commission is 10 Ladybug Lane, Concord, N.H. 
03301; telephone (603) 224-6966.
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enough catastrophes for the Commission to really "strut its 
stuff.”64
3. Funding:
With a budget of only $28,000 for fiscal year 1991, funding is 
hardly a problem for any budget. Still, the system that the
Commission has in place is both interesting and unique in that one- 
half of the budget is divided up among the nine jurisdictions 
according to their total acreage in the compact area. The member 
assessments range all the way from 0.9% contribution in Rhode 
Island (512 protected acres) to 29.1% in Maine (17,743 protected 
acres).65 The other half of the budget is divided equally among 
all nine states and provinces. Thus, the funding for the
Commission is derived almost entirely from the budgets of the 
states and provinces, with the exception of an occasional federal 
grant.
4. Role of State Dept./External Affairs:
The two federal levels have expressed little or no concern 
regarding the Commission since Article XIII of the compact states 
that it does not limit the powers of the states (vis-a-vis the 
provinces) nor affect cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service.66 67
Moreover, the straightforward nature of the Commission's objective 
- to prevent and control forest fires - is instrumental in 
garnering support form all governmental levels. As Mullavey put 
it, "fire doesn't respect any boundaries - international or 
otherwise.1,67
64 Ibid.
65 Operations Manual for the Northeastern Forest Fire 
Protection Commission, July 1990, p. 17.
66 "The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission - What 
it is and how it operates," p. B-l.
67 Telephone interview, 23 July 1991.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As demonstrated in this report, there are a number of 
institutional forms and examples for the Council on the Marine 
Environment to follow.68 What is most important to bear in mind 
is that, "form should follow function." That is, whatever the 
Council decides its function to be, so it effectively chooses the 
form it must take.
Thus far, the Council has chosen a "soft-management" course 
(see Council objectives, p. 1). The Council has also demonstrated 
its desire to remain a five jurisdiction group; more specifically, 
to ensure the continued full participation of the Canadian 
provinces. As long as the Council remains on this path, the form 
that it utilizes now is sufficient. If, however, the Council 
should decide to pursue a more authoritative and perhaps regulatory 
position in the region, it must consider a different approach.
It has been demonstrated that the presence of an international 
entity - in this case, a Canadian province - almost immediately 
secures the attention of the U.S. State Department. To be sure, 
there are a great many obstacles in the way of maintaining full 
Canadian membership. For this reason, the Council might seriously 
consider remaining in the position it holds today and adopting a 
wait-and-see approach as to how powerful a regional player it may 
become. Should, however, the Council think it may want some 
regulatory power in the future, it may very well want to start now 
the process of assessing and garnering political support.
After examining the various institutional forms available to 
the Council, perhaps the most appropriate (and again, only if the 
Council wants the regulatory power potentially secured by this 
method) choice would be a combination of the federal interstate 
compact and the regional compact? that is, a compact consisting of 
the five jurisdictions plus a federal member. Although this would 
likely take a great deal of time and negotiation, the presence of 
the federal level(s) at the outset might serve to mitigate likely 
ratification problems.69
68 For a more detailed discussion of these and other forms, 
see the DONAHUE book. It can be ordered from the Michigan Sea 
Grant College Program by calling their publications office at 
(313) 764-1138.
69 As noted in Chapter II, Section D, some federal 
organizations which might be approached include the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the 
Interior and the United States Coast Guard.
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This option is slightly preferable to a treaty in that the 
five compacting jurisdictions are already united and working toward 
their common objectives. Bringing in the federal levels at this 
point, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty broad enough to 
allow for a regulatory commission, would likely delay the Council's 
goals and take potentially just as long to ratify as a compact. In 
other words, since the federal levels have been uninvolved to date, 
it might be best for it to stay that way. In so doing, the Council 
members are able to maintain their positions as the principal 
negotiators and spokespersons rather than forfeit that role to the 
executive branches.
If it appeared that such a compact would not be ratified, and 
the Council still wanted to be a regulatory power, it might choose 
to create an interstate compact consisting of Maine, New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts with a Canadian equivalent. Although this would 
likely weaken the relationship between the five jurisdictions, it 
would be one way to secure an authoritative position for the 
Council's goals in the region.
In any event, the deciding factor in the Council's choice for 
its future comes down to whether it desires a governing role in the 
region, similar to that of the Northwest Power Planning Council or 
a "softer,” advisory and coordinating role as with the St. Croix 
International Waterway Commission. Given the commendable progress 
and cohesiveness already characteristic of the Council, the 
opportunity certainly exists for it to forge its own path in 
becoming an important regional entity.
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VERSION: Introduced 
DATE-INTRO: January 31, 1991 
SYNOPSIS:
An act to add Division 21.5 (commencing with Section 31500) to the Public 
Resources Code, relating to coastal resources.
DIGEST:
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 393, as introduced, Hauser. Pacific Ocean Resources Compact.
Under existing law, the Administrator for Oil Spill Response is vested with 
specified powers and duties concerning prevention, removal, abatement, response, 
containment, and cleanup of oil spills in marine waters of the state.
This bill would ratify the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact containing 
specified provisions for the regulation of the transportation of oil or 
hazardous substances on offshore waters and specified related matters. The 
compact would take effect after one or more of the States of Alaska, Hawaii, 
Oregon, or Washington ratify the compact and consent is granted by Congress.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. State-mandated 
local program: no.
TEXT: The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Division 21.5 (commencing with Section 31500) is added to the 
Public Resources Code, to read:
DIVISION 21.5. PACIFIC OCEAN RESOURCES COMPACT
31500. (a) The Legislature of the State of California hereby ratifies the 
Pacific Ocean Resources Compact as set forth in Section 31501. The compact 
shall take effect after one or more of the States of Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, or 
Washington ratify the compact and consent is granted by Congress as required by 
Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.
(b) In addition to the States of Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, the 
Province of British Columbia may become an associate party to the compact, 
without voting power. Upon request of the Province of British Columbia and
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approval of Congress, the Province of British Columbia may become a full party 
to this compact with the same rights and powers as the party states.
31501. The provisions of the Pacific Ocean Resources Compact are as 
follows:
Article 1. Findings and Purpose
(a) The parties recognize the following:
(1) The States of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington and the 
Province of British Columbia have a common interest in the protection of marine 
and coastal resources. This common interest results from the following:
(A) The fluid, dynamic ocean currents and atmospheric winds that carry 
pollutants beyond one party's coastal area to another.
(B) The migratory nature of many important living marine resources that 
depend upon the marine habitat of various parties for different parts of their 
life cycle.
(C) The economic reliance of each party upon renewable resources of the 
ocean.
(D) The use of the ocean for transport of oil and other hazardous substances 
between ports in the various parties and other nations.
(E) A regional interest in providing a stable environment for those 
communities dependent upon ocean resources and ocean trade for a livelihood.
(2) Some marine resource activities, such as fisheries, are currently highly 
managed with regard for their regional or transboundary nature through existing 
state programs, regional fisheries councils, interstate compacts, and 
international treaties. Because there are existing formal mechanisms for 
interstate cooperation and coordination for these marine resource activities, 
this compact is not intended to encompass these activities.
(3) A formal interstate agreement does not exist to address and resolve 
issues of mutual concern or to coordinate individual programs of the parties 
that affect regional interests in the following areas:
(A) Prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills.
(B) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(C) Oil and hazardous substance spill response plannings.
(D) Environmental monitoring and research.
(4) Each party has jurisdiction over the submerged and submersible lands 
within its territorial sea and responsibility for management of many marine 
resources and ocean uses. Each party has unique natural resource, social, 
economic, and political conditions for which local management by the individual 
party is the most appropriate.
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(5) Parties now do not have an effective means to address mutual concerns 
related to transport of oil and hazardous substances in waters within and beyond 
the party's jurisdiction that may jeopardize ocean resources and uses important 
to one or more coastal parties.
(6) The 1983 Presidential Proclamation of the 200-mile United States 
Exclusive Economic Zone has created the opportunity for all coastal states to 
more fully exercise and assert their responsibilities pertaining to the 
protection, conservation, and development of ocean resources under United States 
jurisdiction.
(7) Citizens of the Pacific states and the Province of British Columbia are 
increasingly concerned with the environmental integrity of the ocean and 
protection of all ocean resources.
(8) Recent studies conducted in the wake of major accidental releases of oil 
or hazardous substances have concluded that the existing system of response to 
spills fails to provide adequate protection to ocean resources in the following 
ways:
(A) Inadequate personnel training and qualifications.
(B) Weaknesses in vessel design and integrity.
(C) Insufficient traffic management.
(D) Gaps in regulatory oversight.
(E) Incomplete cost recovery by the states or provinces.
(F) A lack of information about the marine and coastal environments.
(9) A spill or discharge of oil or hazardous substances from an ocean-going 
vessel has the potential of causing major regional impacts.
(b) The purposes of this compact are as follows:
(1) To assist in the promotion of interstate commerce by providing uniform 
regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substances within the 
compact zone.
(2) To provide a legal mechanism to regulate certain ocean activities within 
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone that the parties cannot now 
individually regulate.
(3) To enhance regional sovereignty over issues of critical importance.
(4) To direct federal agencies to act in the best interest of the region.
(5) To foster regional cooperation and pooling of resources to reduce costs 
and increase effective use of scarce resources.
(6) To enhance the oversight and supervision of activities of concern to the 
parties.
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(7) To address issues of mutual concern to the Pacific states and the 
Province of British Columbia and enhance the parties' influence over activities 
of concern that are not now addressed through existing compacts, including the 
following:
(A) Spill prevention.
(B) Transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(C) Spill response planning.
(D) Environmental monitoring and research.
(8) To foster cooperation and coordination among the parties in order to 
increase the effectiveness of the individual party's ocean laws and programs.
(9) To provide technical assistance to parties for ocean activities covered 
by this compact.
(10) To provide for formal participation by the Province of British Columbia 
with the compact to more fully address issues of regional concern.
(11) To ensure that the citizens of the region have opportunities to 
participate in discussions and deliberations of regional ocean resources issues
(12) To establish an innovative system under which the parties can represent 
their shared interests within the compact zone, including both of the following
(A) The maintenance and protection of common ocean resources.
(B) The vessel transportation of oil and other hazardous substances.
(13) To establish uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment 
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances within the compact zone 
and to provide oversight for the implementation of these standards and 
regulations by federal agencies, states, or provinces and private industry.
(14) To promote more coordinated management of ocean resources that are of 
mutual concern.
(15) To provide a forum for the regional coordination of the individual 
parties' plans for the management and protection of those areas of the Pacific 
Ocean and adjacent waters over which the parties jointly or separately now have 
or may acquire jurisdiction.
Article 2. Definitions
As used in this compact unless the context clearly requires a different 
meaning:
(a) "Compact" means the representative body created by Article 4.
(b) "Compact zone" means the portion of the oceans bordering the parties 
within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
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(c) "Hazardous substance" or "hazardous substances" means any element or 
compound that, when it enters in or upon the water, presents an imminent and 
substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment, 
including, but not limited to, fish, animals, vegetation, or any part of the 
natural habitat in which they are found. "Hazardous substance" includes, but is 
not limited to, a substance designated under Section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of Title 33 
of the United States Code, any element, compound, mixture, solution, or 
substance designated under Section 9602 of Title 42 of the United States Code, 
any hazardous waste having characteristics identified under or listed under 
Section 6921 of Title 42 of the United States Code, any toxic pollutant listed 
under Section 1317 (a) of Title 33 of the United States Code, and any imminently 
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency has taken action under Section 2606 of 
Title 15 of the United States Code.
(d) "Navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial sea.
(e) "Oil" means crude petroleum oil and any other hydrocarbons regardless of 
gravity, which are produced at the well in liquid form by ordinary production 
methods, and any petroleum products or petrochemicals of any kind and in any 
form whether crude, refined, or a petroleum by-product, any kind and in any form 
whether crude, refined, or a petroleum by-product, including petroleum, fuel 
oil, gasoline, lubricating oils, oily sludge, oily refuse, or mixed with other 
wastes, liquefied natural gas, or propane.
(f) "Party" means a state or province that ratifies this compact as provided 
in Article 3.
(g) "Representative" means an individual appointed as provided in Article 4 
to represent a party to the compact.
(h) "Vessel" means a watercraft or other artificial contrivance that is 
constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous substance in 
bulk as cargo or cargo residue, and that does either of the following:
(1) Operates on the navigable waters of the compact zone.
(2) Transfers oil or hazardous substance in a place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.
Article 3. Ratification
(a) This compact shall become operative when two or more of the States of 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington ratify the compact and the 
consent of Congress is granted as required by Section 10 of Article I of the 
Constitution of the United States.
(b) This agreement shall become operative as to the Province of British 
Columbia as a full party upon request of the Province of British Columbia and 
approval of the Congress.
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(a) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is created and shall have its 
offices within the territorial limits of one of the parties, shall carry out its 
duties and functions in accordance with this compact, shall continue in force 
and effect in accordance with this compact, and, except as specifically provided 
in this compact, shall not be considered an agency or instrumentality of the 
United States for the purpose of any federal law. Each party participating in 
this compact shall appoint three persons, subject to the applicable laws of the 
appointing party, to undertake the functions and duties of representatives of 
the compact. The compact shall be invested with the powers and duties set forth 
in this compact.
(b) The term of each representative shall be four years. A representative 
shall hold office until a successor is appointed and qualified, but the 
successor's term shall expire four years from the legal date of expiration of 
the term of the predecessor. Vacancies occurring in the office of a 
representative for any reason or cause shall be filled for the unexpired term by 
the party represented by the vacancy. Any party may remove the representative 
for that party in accordance with the statutes of that party. Each 
representative may delegate to a deputy the power to be present and participate, 
including voting, as the representative or substitute, at any meeting of, or 
hearing by, or other proceeding of, the compact.
(c) The compact shall invite the Director of the Department of 
Transportation, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and 
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or 
their designees to participate as nonvoting members of the compact.
Article 5. Pacific Ocean Resources Compact Authority
(a) The Pacific Ocean Resources Compact is authorized to accomplish the 
following:
(1) Facilitate the prevention of oil and hazardous substance spills through 
the establishment of uniform safety standards for routes, crews, and equipment 
for vessels transporting oil and hazardous substances to the extent that the 
parties and the federal government have that authority within the compact zone.
(2) Ensure a coordinated network of oil and hazardous substance spill 
response plans and programs of the parties, federal agencies, and private 
organizations.
(3) By regulation, establish the requirements for submission of, and approval 
by, the compact of a contingency plan by any vessel transporting oil or 
hazardous substance in the compact zone. The requirements shall be at least as 
stringent as the requirements for spill response plans under Section 4202 of the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380). A plan developed in accordance with 
the regulations adopted by the compact and approved by the compact shall satisfy 
the requirements of Section 4202 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and any 
requirements of an individual party for submitting a vessel contingency or spill 
response plan. In establishing regulations under this subdivision, the compact 
shall work closely with officials of the parties to assure that the vessel 
contingency plans required under this compact are at least as comprehensive as 
similar plans required by the parties and to integrate, to the fullest extent 
possible, any requirements for vessel contingency plans in effect at the time 
the compact initiates its requirements under this subdivision.
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(4) Establish and maintain an informational clearinghouse related to spill 
response, including a directory of personnel, equipment, technical expertise, 
organizations, and other resources available to assist as part of a regional oil 
or hazardous substance spill response.
(5) Provide a forum for discussion and recommendation to resolve conflicts 
among member parties or the federal government regarding various ocean resources 
programs that have been or may be established by each party.
(6) Provide opportunities for public participation in compact activities by 
holding meetings of the compact in various locations within the territorial 
limits of the parties, providing opportunities for public comment at meetings, 
and developing a public outreach program.
(7) Designate state or provincial agency officials to act on behalf of the 
compact as liaisons with federal agencies.
(8) Identify the regional data needs related to ocean resources and recommend 
a method for compiling the data in a format that can be shared by all parties.
(9) Consult with and advise any pertinent party or federal agency with regard 
to problems connected with ocean resources management and recommend the adoption 
of any rules or regulations the compact considers advisable that are within the 
jurisdiction of the agency.
(10) Establish sanctions and a schedule of civil penalties for violations of 
the rules or regulations of the compact and impose those sanctions or civil 
penalties in accordance with Sections 551 to 559, inclusive, and Sections 701 to 
706, inclusive, of Title 5 of the United States Code.
(11) Request the United States Coast Guard to enforce or assist in the 
enforcement of any regulations adopted by the compact related to the prevention 
of and response to oil or hazardous substance spills in the compact zone.
(b) In addition to the authority granted under subdivision (a), the compact 
may do any of the following:
(1) Accept grants and gifts.
(2) Enter into contracts for whose performance the compact shall be solely 
responsible in order to support its operations.
(3) Conduct and prepare, independently or in cooperation with others, 
studies, investigations, research, and programs relating to the purposes of this 
compact.
(4) Conduct public hearings on matters pertaining to the purposes of this 
compact.
(5) Issue subpoenas.
(6) In accordance with the provisions of Sections 551 to 559, inclusive, and 
Sections 701 to 706, inclusive, of Title 5 of the United States Code, enforce 
the rules and regulations adopted by the compact to carry out the authority of 
the compact as set forth in this article.
I
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(7) Appoint technical and advisory committees for the purpose of advising the 
compact on regional ocean resources issues, data needs and format, and other 
purposes related to the compact's activities. A technical or advisory committee 
appointed by the compact shall not be subject to the provisions of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, as amended).
(8) Allow a variance from the provisions of this compact or rules or 
regulations adopted by the compact pursuant to this article. A variance shall be 
based on a showing by the person or entity seeking the variance that the 
activity allowed under the variance will have no regional impact and that the 
variance is economically necessary. Under no circumstances may a variance result 
in the regulation of the transportation of oil or hazardous substances according 
to standards less stringent than standards imposed under federal law.
(c) The compact shall adopt all regulations necessary to carry out its duties 
and exercise its authority under this article. The compact shall adopt the 
regulations in accordance with Sections 500 to 559, inclusive, of Title 5 of the 
United States Code.
Article 6. Pacific Ocean Resources Compact Organization
The compact shall select a chairperson and a vice chairperson. After the 
initial chairperson and vice chairperson are selected, the compact shall 
establish a rotation for the selection of the chairperson and vice chairperson 
so the office rotates through the parties to this compact. The compact shall 
appoint and at its pleasure remove or discharge such officers and employees as 
may be required to carry the provisions of this compact into effect and shall 
fix and determine their duties, qualifications, and compensation. The compact 
shall adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its business. It may 
establish and maintain one or more offices for the transaction of its business 
and may meet at any time or place within the territorial limits of the signatory 
parties, but shall meet at least once a year.
Article 7. Voting and Quorum
(a) A majority of the representatives shall constitute a quorum.
(b) Each party shall be entitled to one vote. No action or decision of the 
compact shall be approved unless the action or decision receives a majority of 
the votes of the parties.
Article 8. Support Agencies
The compact may contract for the staff support necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this compact or request appropriate agencies of the signatory 
parties to act as the research agencies of the compact.
Article 9. Parties' Powers Under Compact
Except as specifically provided in Article 5, nothing in this compact shall 
be construed to limit the powers of any party or to repeal or prevent the 
enactment of any legislation or the enforcement of any requirement imposing 
additional conditions and restrictions to conserve ocean resources.
Article 10. Absence
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Continued absence of representation or of any compact representative from any 
party shall be brought to the attention of the appointing authority of the party 
not represented.
Article 11. Funding
(a) Each party shall contribute to the support of the compact according to 
the party's relative proportion of the party's gross state product, but each 
party shall contribute at least 10 percent of the total annual budget for the 
compact, and no party shall be required to contribute more than 50 percent of 
the total annual budget for the compact.
(b) The annual contribution of each party shall be figured to the nearest one 
hundred dollars ($ 100).
(c) The compact shall prepare an annual budget which shall be approved by 
vote of the compact. After approval, the proposed budget shall be presented to 
the chief executive and legislative body of each party.
(d) Each party shall be responsible for the expenses of its own 
representatives.
Article 12. Withdrawal From Compact
This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each party until 
renounced by it. Renunciation of this compact shall be preceded by sending six 
months' notice in writing of intention to withdraw from the compact to the other 
parties to the compact.
SPONSOR: ASSEMBLY BILL 
No. 393
Introduced by Assembly Member Hauser 
(Principal coauthor: Assembly Member Farr) 
(Coauthor: Assembly Member Felando) 
(Coauthors: Senators Marks and McCorquodale)
January 31, 1991
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